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*The recently published lectures by Martin Wight (1913–72) on the history of Western thought regarding international politics are of exceptional importance. As David Yost points out, the lectures answer a number of questions about what Wight meant by 'traditions' and what his own position was with regard to their validity. Wight's analysis and organizing framework capture and clarify a complex historical reality with greater justice and lucidity than many others that have been proposed. Moreover, the lectures place in perspective what has been the most indisputable criticism of Wight's approach—his 'Eurocentrism' and neglect of non-Western traditions—and illustrate opportunities for further research building on these foundations.**

Martin Wight was, as Adam Roberts has noted, 'perhaps the most profound thinker on international relations of his generation of British academics'.[1] Much of Wight's influence has stemmed from his lectures on the theory of international relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the 1950s. The lectures have been known mainly through the writings of Hedley Bull and Brian Porter, who attended them and had access to Wight's notes after his death.[2]

Wight's publications on this subject during his lifetime were limited to a pamphlet and a few articles and book chapters,[3] and his most extensive works

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1 Adam Roberts, 'Foreword', in Martin Wight, *International theory: the three traditions*, Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, eds (Leicester and London: Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991 and paperback edition April 1994) , p. xxiv. Subsequent page references to this work are given in parentheses in the text.

2 Hedley Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', *British Journal of International Studies*, 2, July 1976, pp. 101–16; Brian Porter, 'Patterns of thought and practice: Martin Wight's international theory', in Michael Donelan, ed., *The reason of states: a study in international political theory* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1978).

3 See, above all, Martin Wight, *Power politics* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946); 'Western values in international relations', 'The balance of power' and 'Why is there no international theory?', all in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds, *Diplomatic investigations: essays in the theory of international politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966); and 'The balance of power and international order', in Alan James, ed., *The bases of international order: essays in honour of C. A. W. Manning* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).

concerned the history of British colonialism.[4] Indeed, only one book chapter—his classic essay, 'Western values in international relations'—outlined Wight's path-breaking organization of the history of Western thinking about international politics into three categories, or traditions.[5] Three books by Wight have been published posthumously: *Systems of states* in 1977,[6] *Power politics* in 1978,[7] and *International theory: the three traditions* in 1991. The last of these is based on Wight's notes for the widely discussed lectures given in the 1950s, on which his wife Gabriele worked with Brian Porter to prepare a publishable text that is, in her words, 'as true to the original as possible', with 'no additions and few omissions' (p. vi).

Wight's lectures are important because much of the theoretical literature about international politics is pitched at an abstract and general level. Policy-oriented students find it hard to imagine that such works can offer much help in understanding the choices and interactions of governments and organizations, of politicians, diplomats, soldiers, and so forth. Wight, however, was a historian who grounded his findings about theory and philosophy in solid scholarship about how specific thinkers and policy-makers interpreted events in concrete historical contexts. His analysis—compact, aphoristic and richly documented—provides a robust and unequalled guide to the history of Western thought about the fundamental questions of international politics. The conceptual antecedents of current debates are outlined with great erudition and clarity. Wight's profound and acute observations illuminate past conceptual frameworks and, in several cases, their continuing relevance as an inspiration for analysis and action. Wight's work vividly evokes the central frameworks of Western statecraft, including recurrences, adjustments and never-resolved dilemmas and paradoxes. His analysis teaches us humility about our 'originality' and about the limits of the theoretical enterprise.

Wight's analysis

Wight held that 'international theory is the political philosophy of international relations' (p. 1). He suggested three reasons for the dominance of state-centred theorizing in Western political philosophy since the sixteenth century. First, during the period from the fourteenth century to the mid-seventeenth century,

[4] Martin Wight, *The development of the Legislative Council, 1606-1945* (London: Faber & Faber, 1946); *The Gold Coast Legislative Council* (London: Faber & Faber, 1947); and *British colonial constitutions 1947* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952).

[5] A short article on the same theme, a lecture given by Wight in Geneva in 1960, was published in 1987: Martin Wight, 'An anatomy of international thought', *Review of International Studies* 13, July 1987, pp. 221–7. Wight published little of his work, Bull observed, because he was a 'perfectionist' who believed (in Albert Wohlstetter's phrase) 'in a high ratio of thought to publication'. Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', p. 101.

[6] Martin Wight, *Systems of states*, ed. Hedley Bull (London: Leicester University Press in association with the London School of Economics and Political Science, 1977). For background, see David S. Yost, 'New perspectives on historical states-systems', *World Politics* 32, October 1979, pp. 151–68.

[7] Martin Wight, *Power politics*, eds Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (London: Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1978). This is a revised and expanded version of the 1946 pamphlet with the same title, which was unfinished at the time of Wight's death (see note 3 above).

many Europeans saw the main political task as building sovereign states that would provide domestic order and security from foreign enemies and that would acknowledge no feudal obligations nor any political superior, despite the claims of the Roman Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire. Second, the Renaissance rediscovery of Graeco-Roman civilization—including the writings of Plato—reinforced the inclination to consider the sovereign state the proper form of political organization, because much of classical political philosophy concerns the *polis*, the self-governing city-state. Third, during the wars of religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Protestants and humanists developed arguments in support of state sovereignty and autonomy independent of any external power, partly to erode the lingering medieval pretensions to universal authority of the Catholic Church. Such arguments were found useful by Catholic sovereigns interested in justifying the absoluteness of their own powers. Subsequent political philosophy in the West has been in large part concerned with the struggle for constitutionalism—that is, checks and balances to control the exertion of state powers.

The theoretical literature about international politics has accordingly been sparse and scattered. Three main sources nonetheless stand out, in Wight's view. First, some authorities on international law—including Grotius and the great Spanish neo-scholastics such as Suarez and Vitoria—wrote works of continuing relevance. Second, some political philosophers—notably, Kant, Rousseau, Hume and Tocqueville—devoted some works to international politics. Third, some practising politicians—for instance, Machiavelli, Burke, Bismarck, Lincoln, Churchill, Lenin and Woodrow Wilson—outlined their thinking in histories, memoirs, treatises, speeches or other statements.

Wight described the lectures as 'in the first place an experiment in classification, in typology, and in the second an exploration of continuity and recurrence, a study in the uniformity of political thought; and its leading premiss is that political ideas do not change much, and the range of ideas is limited' (p. 5). Wight apparently derived part of his inspiration from an observation in 1852 by Tocqueville: 'It is unbelievable how many systems of morals and politics have been successively found, forgotten, rediscovered, forgotten again, to reappear a little later, always charming and surprising the world as if they were new, and bearing witness, not to the fecundity of the human spirit, but to the ignorance of men.' Tocqueville went on to argue, Wight noted, that it would be possible, 'by studying the most illustrious writers who have engaged in moral and political studies throughout the centuries, to rediscover what are the principal ideas in these fields which have been in circulation among the human race—to reduce them to quite a small number of systems—and so to compare them with one another and to pass judgment on them' (pp. 5–6). This is the challenge Wight undertook in these lectures, concentrating on the period since Machiavelli.

As the book's title indicates, Wight concluded that the writers and ideas could be placed into three traditions: Realists, Rationalists, and Revolutionists, names that 'do not sacrifice accuracy in any degree to the charms of alliteration' (p. 7). Realists, or Machiavellians, emphasize the anarchical elements of international

politics: 'sovereign states acknowledging no political superior, whose relationships are ultimately regulated by warfare'. Rationalists, or Grotians, concentrate on 'diplomacy and commerce' and other institutions for 'continuous and organized intercourse between these sovereign states'. Revolutionists, or Kantians, underscore the 'concept of a society of states, or family of nations' and pursue the realization of an imperative vision of the moral unity of mankind (pp. 7–8). Realist views have been advanced by philosophers such as Bacon and Hobbes and by policy-makers such as Frederick the Great and Napoleon. Realists have tended to deny the existence of international moral and legal obligations based on natural law, and have appealed—implicitly, if not explicitly—to principles of expediency such as justification by success.

Rationalists have been closely associated with Western traditions of constitutional government. Philosophers such as Aristotle and Locke and politicians such as Burke, Gladstone, Lincoln and Churchill have usually taken Rationalist positions, holding that moral obligations rooted in natural law (and discernible by reason) should be respected. Rationalists have also emphasized the moral tensions and difficulties involved in limiting power and in identifying the lesser evil in specific situations.

The most prominent examples of Revolutionist thinking include the Protestant and Catholic factions in the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, each asserting rights and duties to intervene in other states to promote the success of their own doctrines; the intellectual forefathers of the French Revolution, such as Rousseau, and its leaders, particularly the Jacobins; the champions of 'ideological uniformity' as a path to international order and security, such as Kant, Mazzini and Woodrow Wilson; the proponents of a gradual convergence of interests through commerce and a consensus of world public opinion, such as Cobden and Bright; and totalitarian ideologues, both communists and fascists, who have tried to impose their conceptions through conquest and coercion. Revolutionists have tended to argue that the end justifies the means, or that political ethics must be identical to those of private life.

After providing an initial definition and discussion of each tradition, Wight devoted separate lectures to how the three traditions have dealt with fundamental issues: human nature; international society; relations with non-European 'barbarians'; national power; national interest; foreign policy; the balance of power; diplomacy; war; and international law, obligation and ethics. Each tradition is rooted in distinct premisses that shape the interpretation of events and help to define prescriptions for action.

What Wight meant by 'traditions'

The lectures clarify what Wight meant by the word 'traditions' and the extent to which, in his judgement, each tradition displays intellectual continuity. It is the Realists and Rationalists, he held, who have drawn on coherent intellectual traditions. The Rationalists have travelled 'the road with the most conscious

acknowledgment of continuity', beginning with 'the Greeks and especially the Stoics' and proceeding down a broad path with many representatives, including Aquinas, Grotius, Madison, Tocqueville and Lincoln (pp. 14–15). The Realist tradition is 'virtually as self-conscious and as continuous as the Rationalist', with Machiavelli's approach an example for Bacon, Hobbes, Frederick the Great, Bismarck, E. H. Carr and others (pp. 16–17). In contrast, 'the Revolutionist ancestry of ideas and continuity of thought is ambiguous or uncertain. The Revolutionist tradition is less a stream than a series of waves ... [or] disconnected illustrations of the same politico-philosophical truths... It is characteristic of Revolutionism ... to deny its past, to try to start from scratch, to jump out of history and begin again' (p. 12).

One of the criticisms made of Wight's outline of the three traditions, mainly as reported by Bull and Porter, was that they were Procrustean and could not do justice to individual philosophers and policy-makers. As Roy Jones noted in 1981, 'There was more than one side to Machiavelli after all.'[8] The lectures reveal that Wight made the same point in the 1950s: 'Machiavelli was inspired to write by a passion foreign to the principles of his theory—a passion which breaks out in the last chapter of *The Prince*' (pp. 259–60). Furthermore, Wight cited examples of 'how far Machiavelli was from cheap Machiavellianism, and how his recommendations are more penetrating, and one jump ahead, of his self-appointed disciples' (p. 151). Similarly, Wight noted that Kant himself rejected 'the Revolutionary Kantian principle . . . that the end justifies the means' (p. 162).

Wight gave many other examples of specific philosophers and decision-makers who cannot be confined to a single tradition. He noted, for instance, that Aristotle, forerunner of much of the Rationalist tradition of constitutional government (pp. 109, 129), taught the Realist principle that 'barbarians, non-Greeks, were slaves by nature' and fit to be subjugated (pp. 51–2). Wight repeatedly noted that 'the three traditions are not clear-cut pigeon-holes, but can overlap' (p. 15). He compared the traditions to colours that might be mixed across a spectrum (p. 216) and to 'streams, with eddies and cross-currents, sometimes interlacing . . . They both influence and cross-fertilize one another, and they change, although without, I think, losing their inner identity' (p. 260). In other words, his work was 'an attempt to pin down and define the *central* principles and *characteristic* doctrines of each of the three traditions' (p. 258, emphasis in original).

After one particularly incisive summary of the essential differences between the three traditions, Wight declared that

> all this is merely classification and schematizing. In all political and historical studies the purpose of building pigeon-holes is to reassure oneself that the raw material does *not* fit into them. Classification becomes valuable, in humane studies, only at the point

[8] Roy E. Jones, 'The English school of international relations: a case for closure', *Review of International Studies* 7, Jan. 1981, p. 10.

where it breaks down. The greatest political writers in international theory almost all straddle the frontiers dividing two of the traditions, and most of these writers transcend their own systems. (p. 259, emphasis in original)

Furthermore, to be faithful to the historical evidence, Wight identified subcategories and anomalies in the three main traditions. For instance, he distinguished 'soft' Revolutionists, such as Kant and Wilson, from 'hard' Revolutionists such as the Jacobins and Marxist-Leninists: in contrast with the gradual and legalistic approach of the former, the latter have championed the use of violence to bring about a transformation of world politics (pp. 46–47, 267). He also suggested that 'if Realism is defined by the classic Realists—Machiavelli, Richelieu, Hobbes, Hume, Frederick II, Hegel—then contemporary Realists appear as much Rationalist as Realist'; and he cited statements by George F. Kennan and Hans Morgenthau as examples (p. 267).[9]

Wight also discussed a fourth tradition, historically of lesser importance, which he called 'inverted Revolutionism'—a tradition 'of whom pacifists are the chief, although not the only, example' (p. 254). The goal of this approach, notably as expounded by the Quakers, is 'evoking the latent power of love in all people, and transforming the world by the transformation of souls' (p. 257). 'It is "inverted" because it repudiates the use of power altogether; it is "Revolutionist" because it sees this repudiation as a principle of universal validity, and energetically promotes its acceptance' (p. 108). Wight maintained that inverted Revolutionism usually partakes of 'a Realist analysis of politics', giving examples such as Tolstoy's *War and peace* and early Quaker statements comparing men to 'raging lions' (pp. 19–20, 109–10).

In short, by 'tradition' Wight did not mean that new adherents to a way of thinking have always been strongly influenced and even guided by the analyses formulated by their predecessors, with certain sets of ideas developed with great continuity and deliberation over centuries. The Revolutionist 'tradition' in particular has been marked by profound discontinuities. Even within the traditions with a greater degree of cohesion (the Realists and the Rationalists), individual analysts and policy-makers have rediscovered and rethought old principles for themselves and have devised approaches extending beyond the notional limits of the tradition. Thus, the traditions are not straitjackets, but organizing frameworks used to group closely related and often interdependent ideas together.

[9] For a comparable judgement about the moral as well as pragmatic concerns of some contemporary realists, see the incisive essay by Robert G. Gilpin, 'The richness of the tradition of political realism', in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). Churchill offered a brilliant combination of Realist and Rationalist themes in his March 1936 speech on the enduring principles of British foreign policy, reproduced in *The gathering storm*, vol. I of *The Second World War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), pp. 207–10.

Wight's own position

Wight concentrated on the first part of Tocqueville's challenge, and—with regard to Western societies, at least—he succeeded in his attempt 'to delimit the scope of international theory, to mark out its boundaries, stake its circle' and thus to demonstrate that 'the great moral debates of the past are in essence our debates' (p. 268). Wight was generally less explicit in carrying out the second part of Tocqueville's challenge—'to pass judgment' on the main traditions of thinking about international relations. Wight's exposition was often detached, with a clear striving to provide a balanced analysis of each tradition.

Perhaps partly because of works such as his 1946 pamphlet *Power politics* and his essays on the balance of power, many have assumed that Wight was a Realist. In 1982, Alan James wrote, 'As a teacher and writer Wight falls unambiguously into the category which is widely termed, not least by himself, realist.'[10] Hedley Bull, however, suggested that 'if we had to put Martin Wight into one or another of his own three pigeon-holes there is no doubt that we should have to consider him a Grotian', partly because of this tradition's *via media* qualities and its recognition of the moral complexity of international relations. But, Bull continued, 'it would be wrong to force Martin Wight into the Grotian pigeon-hole. It is a truer view of him to regard him as standing outside the three traditions, feeling the attraction of each of them but unable to come to rest within any one of them, and embodying in his own life and thought the tension among them.' Even though 'the Grotian elements in his thinking became stronger' over the years, 'Wight was too well aware of the vulnerability of the Grotian position ever to commit himself to it fully'. The main vulnerability of the Grotian position, Bull suggested, is that it may be a luxury available only to the strongest and most satisfied powers, which may adopt Rationalist legal and moral positions as instruments to protect acquisitions made through Realist means.[11]

The lectures offer evidence to support all these judgements. Wight denied any intention of trying to make a case for one of the traditions: 'In this course of lectures I have not wanted to favour any particular international theory' (p. 267). At one point, however, he wrote, 'Realists . . . emphasize in international relations the element of anarchy, of power-politics, and of warfare. Everyone is a Realist nowadays, and the term in this sense needs no argument' (p. 15). Elsewhere he described Rationalism as 'a road on which I suppose all of us, in certain moods, feel we really belong' (p. 14). In the last paragraph of the book, Wight indicated: 'I find my own position shifting round the circle. You will have guessed that my prejudices are Rationalist, but I find I have become more Rationalist and less Realist through rethinking this question during the course of giving these lectures' (p. 268).

[10] Alan James, 'Michael Nicholson on Martin Wight: a mind passing in the night', *Review of International Studies* 8, April 1982, p. 118.

[11] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', pp. 107–8. This essay is reproduced at the beginning of *International theory: the three traditions*—in a slightly abridged form, unfortunately. The citations here refer to the complete original version.

Indeed, the lectures include implicit judgements on some Realists as cynical and amoral and on the 'hard' Revolutionists as fanatical and ready to commit atrocities in the name of their vision. Wight discussed in some detail historical examples of Realist endorsements of *raison d'état* principles of fraud, deception, and betrayal in seizing opportunities to eliminate adversaries, to conquer the vulnerable or to gain other advantages. Some Realists have defined such acts as morally neutral means to advance the interests of the state. Wight commented: 'That is, shoot first and litigate afterwards' (p. 246). Without explicitly condemning such Realists, Wight wrote: 'To regard politics as the sphere of the non-moral is in effect to regard it as the sphere of the immoral. This is the implication of Cavour's famous saying: "If we were to do for ourselves, what we are doing for Italy, we should be great rogues."' (p. 247).

Wight was less inhibited in revealing his reservations about the Revolutionists, particularly those determined to exterminate people unwilling to accept their vision of a redeemed humanity. Wight noted that some Revolutionists

> use extermination not just as an instrument of policy, but as a matter of principle: earlier Revolutionists would have said, as a matter of duty; contemporary ones would say, 'scientifically'. To go back to the Albigensian Crusade, the first crusade turned against Christendom itself; at the Sack of Beziers in 1209, the cry was: 'Kill them. For God will know his own.' This terrible saying has echoed down the centuries, with different variations of the same theme. (p. 225)

Examples include the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the wars of the French Revolution (especially the civil conflicts within France itself) and the vast extermination programmes conducted by totalitarian regimes, notably Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Wight observed: 'It is really an extreme form of optimism to believe that by decimating the human race you can make the residue virtuous, and that such methods will not affect the results' (p. 28).

Wight offered few criticisms of the Rationalists, but noted that some of their principles could readily be abused. 'Thus almost the same pious form of words can be used . . . not only to justify not abdicating an [overseas colonial] administration . . . on the grounds that the political order would disappear and anarchy would result with a vast increase in suffering (Burke's argument); but also to justify extending a government by annexing a new province' (p. 77). Moreover, Rationalists have tended to avert their eyes from unpleasant truths underscored by the Realists.

> All states and nations, even welfare states, have been built by struggle and war. Hence the radical ambiguity of a position like that of the Western powers after 1919, who after a successful career as burglars tried to settle down as country-gentlemen making intermittent appearances on the magistrate's bench. One can ask whether they ever found the theoretical, moral answer to the Realist critique levelled at them by Axis propaganda: that they had got where they were by struggle; that they could not

contract out of the struggle at a moment that happened to suit them; and still less could they justify and protect themselves in an attempt at contracting out of it by appealing to sets of moral principles which they had ignored when they were committed to the struggle. (p. 210)

By clarifying Wight's own position, the lectures provide a response to another question that has been raised repeatedly: whether Wight retained in his maturity the pacifist positions he championed as a young man. In an article published in 1936, when he was 22 years old, he outlined the arguments for Christian pacifism and the shortcomings of the just war doctrine in a historical and theological perspective; and in 1940 he declared himself a conscientious objector.[12] Although Bull and Porter, in their descriptions of Wight's then unpublished lectures, had mentioned Wight's discussion of pacifism as a form of 'inverted Revolutionism',[13] critics such as Michael Nicholson complained that 'pacifism is a central moral problem which is not dealt with in Wight's later [that is, post-Second World War] writing'. Wight was thus accused of inconsistency: 'The problem of reconciling Wight, the power politician with Wight the pacifist is a delicate operation to put it mildly.'[14]

Bull concluded that pacifism was evidently only an early phase of Wight's thinking: 'As Wight grew older his pacifism appears to have dropped away; those who met him in later life found no inkling of it in his views.'[15] Alan James has argued, as noted earlier, that Wight's analysis of international politics was Realist; but James has also suggested that Wight may have nonetheless remained a pacifist in his private convictions. According to James, 'there is no evidence that he abandoned this position' [that is, pacifism], and 'he may just have drifted away from pacifism, while still accepting its theological validity.'[16] Gabriele Wight has reported, however, that 'Martin himself in his own *c.v.* publications lists *never* included that article.'[17] She has added that 'Martin never, I enquired extensively from friends of that time, referred to the conscientious objection ever again; neither still during the war nor later; neither to very close Christian friends or others, nor to colleagues nor to me'.[18]

In the lectures it appears that Wight later associated at least some approaches to pacifism with Revolutionist visions of messianic fulfilment and permanent progress in this world, visions about which he expressed profound scepticism. Wight described the inverted Revolutionist tradition, including pacifism, as accurately and sympathetically as possible, but his comments imply an ultimately negative judgement because of the 'difficulties' it presents. To begin with,

[12] Martin Wight, 'Christian pacifism', *Theology* 33, July 1936, pp. 12–21. Wight's application of May 1940 is cited at length in Hedley Bull, 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', in Wight, *Systems of states*, p. 4.

[13] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', p. 106; Porter, 'Patterns of thought and practice', p. 68.

[14] Michael Nicholson, 'The enigma of Martin Wight', *Review of International Studies* 7, Jan. 1981, p. 18.

[15] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', p. 5.

[16] James, 'Michael Nicholson on Martin Wight', pp. 117–23.

[17] Letter from Gabriele Wight to the author, 17 Sept. 1993; emphasis in original.

[18] Letter from Gabriele Wight to the author, 22 Nov. 1993.

Adopting the perfectionist ethic (asserting that the way of testimony is greater than the way of compromise, and the principle of meliorism greater than that of choosing the lesser evil), in the hope of escaping from the ambiguities and cutting through the entanglements of political ethics, nevertheless leads speedily back again to the maze of the double standard. (p. 256)

As a result, the inverted Revolutionist may be led to a quietist 'withdrawal into the sphere of the private ethic, and repudiation of the political sphere altogether', or to 'a doctrine which seems, to the external critic, to carry the impulse to revise one's practice upwards to the point where one's feet lose contact with the earth. The repudiation of the principle of lesser evil can become the pursuit of the illusory alternative' (pp. 256–7).[19]

Wight's implicit rejection of pacifism in his maturity should have already been clear from his publications during his lifetime. In the 1960s, he wrote that the Grotian tradition represents 'the *juste milieu* between definable extremes'. He cited, among other examples, 'the policy of collective security between the World Wars as a middle way between the pacifists and disarmers on the one side and the imperialists turned appeasers on the other', and the statement by Grotius that 'A remedy must be found for those that believe that in war nothing is lawful, and for those for whom all things are lawful in war'.[20]

Assessing criticisms of Wight's analysis

No doubt because Wight never found the time to prepare the lecture notes for publication himself, the terminology is not always consistent and some passages seem sketchy and unfinished—for example, with regard to the relative strengths of the traditions during certain periods of history since the late fifteenth century (pp. 162–3). It is reasonable to speculate that, had Wight reworked the passages dealing with the twentieth-century totalitarian Revolutionists, he would have developed further the differences as well as the similarities, along the lines indicated in his historical works. Wight once pointed out, for instance, following Franz Borkenau, that fascists made statements about what they deemed the probable duration of their dominance (such as Mussolini's claim for a fascist century and Hitler's assertions about a thousand-year Reich), whereas communists would not admit of any end-point for their triumph.[21]

More fundamentally, Wight might well have chosen to elaborate on his comments about Hitler and Mussolini and other fascists, and to make their

[19] It might also be noted that Wight's reference to pacifism in analysing British appeasement policies in the 1930s is hardly positive (p. 265).

[20] Wight, 'Western values in international relations', p. 91.

[21] Martin Wight, 'The balance of power', in Arnold Toynbee, ed., *The world in March 1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 516n, 521n. The 'three-cornered dialogue' in this essay, based on statements by the German and Italian fascists, the Soviet communists, and the Western powers (represented mainly by Britain and France), underlines a number of contrasts and commonalities in the fascist and communist positions. The similarities extend beyond the opportunism of fascist and communist party elites claiming a Rousseauite type of 'general will' legitimacy.

differences from the Soviet communists more evident. Statements or decisions by Hitler are cited as examples of both Realism (pp. 31, 169, 172, 210) and Revolutionism (pp. 43, 118). The communists held forth visions of a future utopia, a world without war or oppression; but it is not apparent how the Revolutionist principle of the moral unity of mankind could be reconciled with fascist 'master race' claims. In one passage Nazi racism is described as 'on the border-line between Revolutionism and Realism' (p. 65), and in another fascists are held to 'show characteristics of both ways of thought' (p. 215). In several respects, Wight suggested, the fascist ideologies partook both of 'extreme' Realism and of 'hard' Revolutionism (for instance, in glorifying war and rejecting Rationalist international moral and legal obligations); and Wight might have developed this theme in greater depth if he had had the opportunity to do so.

Sometimes the unfinished quality of the work is evident in clear contradictions. At one point, for example, Wight asserted that 'all Revolutionism is of a Christian pattern, whether Rousseauite or Marxist . . . The ancient world has no tradition of political thought comparable to Revolutionism' (p. 109). In another discussion of the possible intellectual origins of Revolutionism, however, Wight referred to (a) the Revolutionist 'doctrinal imperialism' implicit in the Old Testament concept of a 'chosen people', a concept adopted by Puritan England and various other societies, and (b) the extraordinary Revolutionist impact of Virgil's *Aeneid*, an epic that 'has influenced European history more deeply than any book except the Bible'. The *Aeneid*, Wight noted, was 'the supreme expression of the imperial mission of Rome; and belief in this mission influenced Augustus and pervaded medieval culture' (pp. 43–4). Moreover, Wight also discussed the Revolutionist 'concept of the brotherhood of mankind', first expounded by Alexander the Great, and developed by Stoic philosophers such as Zeno and Marcus Aurelius (pp. 83–4).

Despite their somewhat unfinished character, the lectures form a coherent whole. Their publication therefore makes it possible to judge whether Wight's work deserved the criticisms directed against it. According to Bull, for example,

> Wight was . . . too ambitious in attributing to the Machiavellians, the Grotians and the Kantians distinctive views not only about war, peace, diplomacy, intervention and other matters of International Relations but about human psychology, about irony and tragedy, about methodology and epistemology. There is a point at which the debate Wight is describing ceases to be one that has actually taken place, and becomes one that he has invented; at this point his work is not an exercise in the history of ideas, so much as the exposition of an imaginary philosophical conversation, in the manner of Plato's dialogues.[22]

The published lectures reveal that this analogy is strikingly evocative but not entirely just. Wight underscored contrasts between the traditions as paradigms or ideal types, but he was too conscientious a historian to invent a dialogue

[22] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', p. 111.

decoupled from actual events. He identified observable differences in philosophies, policies and assumptions; and he grounded his judgements in specific and carefully documented facts. He rarely offered a generalization about abstract principles without backing it up with at least one, and often several, historical examples. Moreover, the published lectures do not include any discussions of 'irony and tragedy', much less efforts to relate them to each tradition. Nor is any attempt made to attribute distinct views about psychology to each tradition. The few references to psychology mostly concern Freud's statement that 'the tendency to aggression is an innate independent instinctual disposition in man'—a view that Wight categorized as a Realist judgement about human nature (pp. 21, 25). The brief but pointed distinctions Wight offered about 'methodology and epistemology' centre on the philosophical approach to history that each tradition tends to favour and thus the characteristic types of statements made within each tradition.

Wight suggested, for instance, that Realists generally view history as cyclical and repetitive and hence a reliable source of lessons for the guidance of astute policy-makers. Revolutionists are prone 'to see history as linear, moving upwards towards an apocalyptic denouement' and 'messianic fulfilment', the triumph of the true faith, conceived in religious, political, and/or economic terms. Rationalists appeal to reason and moral obligations and advocate prudent attempts to pursue constructive international cooperation; but they are usually 'cautious and agnostic' about any pattern or ultimate meaning in history, aware of the unpredictable and contingent and manifesting no confidence in the permanence of any apparent progress in political institutions (pp. 29, 161).

These philosophical approaches to history are, Wight argued, consistent with each tradition's methodological inclination. Realists are prone to make sociological statements on the basis of an empirical analysis of history. 'For example: Machiavelli's "armed prophets [Moses, Hitler] conquer; unarmed prophets [Savonarola, Trotsky] are destroyed" and Carr's "international order . . . will always be the slogan of those who feel strong enough to impose it on others"' (p. 21). Revolutionists are attracted to imperative prescriptions, whether of church doctrine, the Rights of Man, the proletariat, or another cause, such as 'Workers of the world, unite', in *The Communist Manifesto* (pp. 22–23). Rationalists tend to make ontological, or *a priori*, assertions about the nature and purpose of international obligations, such as the preamble to the United Nations Charter, written by Field Marshal J. C. Smuts: 'We the peoples of the United Nations, determined . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small' (p. 22).

Another charge that Bull lodged against Wight was a 'failure to deal with the history of thought about economic aspects of International Relations'.[23] It would be more accurate to say that Wight dealt with economic questions to the extent that he found them relevant to the political philosophers and policy-

[23] Ibid., p. 112.

makers he surveyed. In the Rationalist tradition, for instance, commerce forms part of international 'customary society', and Rationalists have seen trade as one proof, among others, that 'at any given moment the greater part of the totality of international relationships reposes on custom rather than force' (p. 39). Marxist–Leninists have, of course, been ideologically committed to the principle of economic class struggle, and have devised doctrines such as 'the uneven development of capitalism' to account for unanticipated events (pp. 107–108). 'Soft' Revolutionists such as Cobden and Bright drew inspiration from Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' and held (much as Kant had argued in some works) that *laissez-faire* commerce would elevate living conditions and standards of education while deepening international 'material interdependence', and would thus enhance the power of 'moral suasion' in world public opinion (pp. 114–5, 144, 202, 263). Realists, Rationalists and Revolutionists have long differed about how to define and calibrate the economic elements of national power (and about how to assess the balance of power), Wight noted, owing in part to what Cobden described as the 'silent and peaceful aggrandisements which spring from improvement and labour' (p. 175).[24]

Finally, the charge of 'pessimism' must be considered. Bull judged that 'Martin Wight's view of International Relations has as its central characteristic his pessimism'.[25] This judgement was based on Wight's consistent view that 'International politics is the realm of recurrence and repetition; it is the field in which political action is most regularly necessitous'. It is thus, Wight concluded, 'incompatible with progressivist theory'.[26] Wight summarized Kant's arguments in *Eternal Peace* for progress and ultimate success in the elimination of war and commented: 'It is surely not a good argument for a theory of international politics that we shall be driven to despair if we do not accept it.'[27] Wight held that 'War is inevitable, but particular wars can be avoided. This means living with endless uncertainties and crises.'[28] Michael Nicholson and others have deplored Wight's lack of faith in progress in the development of theoretical analyses of international politics that would enable humanity 'to avoid war' and build 'a peaceful world'. In Nicholson's words, 'My real complaint against Martin Wight is that he made pessimism respectable in British [studies of] international relations'.[29]

[24] While it is unreasonable to reproach Wight for not accomplishing what he did not undertake, the economic—and demographic—factors that may underlie consciously formulated and articulated rationales for decisions deserve more study. Among other sources in this regard, see John Maynard Keynes, *The general theory of employment, interest and money* (London: Macmillan, 1936), pp. 348, 381–4; William H. McNeill, *Population and politics since 1750* (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 1990), pp. 20–1, 41, 51, 57, 70; and Andrew W. Marshall, 'Strategy as a profession for future generations', in Andrew W. Marshall, J. J. Martin and Henry S. Rowen, eds, *On not confusing ourselves: essays on national security strategy in honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), pp. 302–11.

[25] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', p. 11.

[26] Wight, 'Why is there no international theory?', p. 26.

[27] Ibid., pp. 27–8.

[28] Wight, *Power politics*, 1978 ed, p. 143.

[29] Nicholson, 'The enigma of Martin Wight', pp. 20, 22. For similar criticisms, reproaching Wight for his doubts about the possibility of 'progressive' change in international politics, see Roy E. Jones, 'The myth of the special case in international relations', *Review of International Studies* 14, Oct. 1988, pp. 267–74.

The lectures confirm Wight's rejection of theories that posit the feasibility of eliminating war. Wight's own views appear to have been closest to those of the Rationalists, as noted above. In the lectures, Wight indicated that the Rationalist tradition has tended to accept war 'as a normal expression of human nature, although also a detestable one, and to engage in a consideration of how it can be mitigated and limited' (p. 207). Wight implicitly regretted an apparent long-term erosion of support for this approach: 'Rationalism, which used to be an orthodox, traditional, and respectable school of international theory, has grown steadily weaker, steadily dissolved, shedding its strength and support to the schools on the flanks'—that is, Realism and Revolutionism of various types (pp. 266–7). The combination of these trends did not imply any lessening of the probability or severity of war, in Wight's view. Indeed, 'the democratization of domestic life has made *Realpolitik* fanatical. Increasingly since 1789 wars have been revolutionary wars inflicting revolution as well as defeat on the vanquished.' (p. 265).

These conclusions can only be described as 'pessimistic' from a perspective that assumes the feasibility of abolishing war. As Wight once wrote, 'international theory that remains true to diplomatic experience will be at a discount in an age when the belief in progress is prevalent'.[30] Wight lacked the 'optimism' expressed by Kant and others in the Revolutionist tradition, but he also rejected the 'pessimism' about the human condition manifest in the Realist tradition. The Rationalist tradition can be seen as one of prudent and restrained 'optimism' in that it argues for upholding ethical ideals and for efforts to prevent and limit wars, in full recognition that such efforts will sometimes fail.

It is more reasonable to admit that Wight's glass of hope is half full than to complain that it is not overflowing. The second half of the statement cited earlier ('War is inevitable, but particular wars can be avoided') can be seen as an expression of confidence in the ability of policy-makers to gain their ends without war on some occasions. 'It is the task of diplomacy to circumvent the occasions of war, and to extend the series of circumvented occasions . . . [but] The notion that diplomacy can eradicate the causes of war was part of the great illusion after 1919.'[31] In the Rationalist tradition, only limited and temporary progress is feasible, not final victory over war and injustice. 'As the French philosopher Julien Benda has said, mankind has always betrayed its obligations, but so long as it continues to acknowledge and believe in them, the crack is kept open through which civilization can creep.'[32]

[30] Wight, 'Why is there no international theory?', p. 26.
[31] Wight, *Power politics*, 1978 ed, p. 137.
[32] Ibid., p. 293. (This chapter was reproduced without change from the original 1946 edition.) See also Wight, 'Western values in international relations', pp. 130–31.

Comparing Wight's analysis with other interpretations

Several chronological surveys of the history of Western thought about international relations have been prepared,[33] but relatively few attempts have been made to discern patterns and identify coherent traditions or schools of thought over centuries. When such attempts have been made, the tendency has been to organize the material into two categories. F. S. Northedge, for example, divided Western philosophers since antiquity into 'conservatives' and 'abolitionists', defined respectively as 'those who regard war as inevitable, perhaps even desirable, and those who consider it an evil capable of being replaced by lasting peace through good will or improved social arrangements'.[34] In a Europe-centred analysis of the period since 1500, Michael Howard reviewed how various 'liberal' thinkers have, with uneven success, opposed the tenets of 'power politics and *raison d'état*' in efforts to limit, prevent or abolish war.[35] In a review of US foreign policy over two centuries, Paul Seabury divided the analysts and policy-makers into 'realists' and 'idealists'.[36]

These scholars and others have provided evidence to support a twofold differentiation and have called attention to subcategories as well. Wight's tripartite analysis, however, suggests ways in which the value of such studies could be enhanced. The findings of Northedge and Howard, for instance, could be enriched in the light of Wight's analysis. Wight suggested, it will be recalled, a useful distinction between Realists who have endorsed and even celebrated war as a matter of principle, Rationalists who have tried to limit the scope, duration and effects of wars that cannot be avoided, and certain Revolutionists who have sought to eliminate war entirely.

One of the examples Seabury presented to illustrate a polarity between 'realism' and 'idealism' in the history of US foreign relations concerned policy debates in the Roosevelt administration before and during the Second World War. In Seabury's account, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of War Henry Stimson 'perceived the war oppositely through idealist and realist glasses'. According to Seabury:

> To Hull, a convinced idealist and a Wilsonian, the Axis Powers were distinguished by the lawless character of their behavior, by their acts of aggression, by their contempt for contractual agreements, and by their autocratic or totalitarian regimes . . . Stimson and others, however, perceived the war as realists had seen World War I: Hitler's domination of Europe and Japan's of Asia would mean that on both continents the

[33] Recent examples include F. Parkinson, *The philosophy of international relations: a study in the history of thought* (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1977) and Torbjörn L. Knutsen, *A history of international relations theory* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1992).

[34] F. S. Northedge, 'Peace, war, and philosophy', in Paul Edwards, ed., *The encyclopedia of philosophy*, vol. 6 (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1967), pp. 63–7.

[35] Michael Howard, *War and the liberal conscience* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1978), esp. pp. 130–5.

[36] Paul Seabury, 'Realism and idealism', in Alexander DeConde, ed., *Encyclopedia of American foreign policy: studies of the principal movements and ideas* (New York: Scribner's, 1978), pp. 856–66.

balance of power would disappear; America would find itself locked between two powerful giants. Radicals like [Vice-President] Henry Wallace . . . put forward the notion that the true purpose of the wartime alliance was not merely the elimination of fascism from the world but also the establishment of freedom for all peoples, the triumph of democracy, and the elimination of poverty and hunger everywhere.[37]

Rather than describing these views as a 'tension between idealism and realism', with Wallace's idealism more radical than that of Hull, it is more illuminating to consider Hull's views as consistent with the Rationalist tradition of upholding constitutional governments and international law, Stimson's views as representative of the Realist tradition of placing power considerations and security interests first, and Wallace's views as faithful to the Revolutionist impulse to envision a fundamental transformation of international politics towards a harmonious community of mankind as a whole.

In the lectures Wight indicated that one of his objectives was to illustrate the shortcomings and deficiencies of 'two-schools' analyses of the theory of international relations. Wight gave as examples E. H. Carr, with his division between realists and utopians,[38] and Hans Morgenthau, with his realists and idealists. 'Morgenthau implicitly admits that the two-schools scheme breaks down when he allows a category of statesmen with whom there is mysterious coincidence between what moral law demands and what national interest requires' (p. 267). The examples offered by Morgenthau consisted mainly of statesmen such as Gladstone and Franklin D. Roosevelt, who held views (at least on some topics) that Wight classified as falling within the Rationalist tradition.[39]

Although Wight cited several British and US examples as representative of the Rationalist tradition, he did not draw a clear distinction between Anglo-American and continental European theorists. In other words, Wight's analysis did not draw on or support the distinction advanced by Arnold Wolfers, who held that 'While the Continentals were arguing about the dilemma of statesmen faced by the irreconcilable demands of necessity and morality, English and American thinkers in turn were engaged in a debate about the best way of applying accepted principles of morality to the field of foreign policy'. Wolfers acknowledged that 'men like Hobbes, Bacon, Bolingbroke, Hamilton, or Mahan, usually characterized as conservatives, realists, and pessimists . . . stood closer to Machiavelli than to the moralists of their own countries, and . . . concurred with views of their Continental contemporaries'. Wolfers argued, however, that 'even among these representative exponents of what is now often referred to as the power-political school of thought', significant emphasis was

[37] Ibid., p. 862.

[38] E. H. Carr, *The twenty years' crisis, 1919–1939: an introduction to the study of international relations* (London: Macmillan, 1939).

[39] The reference alludes to Hans J. Morgenthau, *In defense of the national interest* (New York: Knopf, 1951), p. 19.

devoted to 'the moral aspects of political choice'.[40] In Wight's analysis, in contrast, the views of British and US analysts and policy-makers are grouped with those of continental Europeans in each of the three traditions.[41]

On the other hand, Wight reached conclusions parallel to those of Wolfers regarding the importance of security as a virtual precondition for perceiving moral opportunities. Wolfers attributed the differences he discerned between Anglo-American philosophies of 'choice' and continental European philosophies of 'necessity' to the greater vulnerability to attack of the continental nations. An 'insular location', Wolfers maintained, gave Britain and the United States 'freedom to remain aloof from many international struggles without a sacrifice of national security, and thus . . . the chance of keeping one's hands clean of many of the morally more obnoxious vicissitudes of power politics to which others were subjected'.[42]

Wight underscored the importance of power as well as location in providing security, however, and argued that:

> It is particularly necessary to guard against the notion that morality in politics is a flower that blooms especially or exclusively in Anglo-Saxon gardens. The first thing to remember about the policies of Gladstone and Franklin Roosevelt is that Gladstone's Britain and Roosevelt's America were dominant powers. This will remind us of the great truth that morality in international politics is not simply a matter of civilized tradition, but is equally the result of security . . . Once security is destroyed, all the higher objects of politics are swallowed up in the struggle for self-preservation, a tendency seen in every war.[43]

Wight's work is also significant because it complements and deepens appreciation of the best-known analysis of the history of Western thought about international politics based on a tripartite organization—Kenneth Waltz's classic *Man, the state and war.* Waltz, it will be recalled, grouped ideas into three 'images' of the causes of war: first-image theorists emphasized human nature, second-image theorists the internal structure of states and third-image theorists international anarchy. The analyses by Waltz and Wight agree on several points: a two-schools approach is 'misleading' because it oversimplifies complex realities;[44] a sound understanding of the dynamics of international politics must

[40] Arnold Wolfers, 'Political theory and international relations', in *Discord and collaboration: essays on international politics* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 244, 246–7. This essay was originally published as the introduction to Arnold Wolfers and Laurence W. Martin, eds, *The Anglo-American tradition in foreign affairs* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1956).

[41] It may be significant, however, that continental Europeans—French, German and Russian—supply most of Wight's examples of force-oriented 'hard' Revolutionism, while Britons and Americans are often cited as espousing 'soft' Revolutionism, based on principles such as free trade and the moral power of world public opinion.

[42] Wolfers, 'Political theory and international relations', pp. 245–6.

[43] Wight, *Power politics*, 1978 ed, p. 292.

[44] Kenneth A. Waltz, *Man, the state and war: a theoretical analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 36.

be based on a combination of all three categories (images in Waltz's case, traditions in Wight's case);[45] each category is based on strongly emphasizing a certain aspect of reality, so much so that it decisively influences the interpretation of events;[46] each of the three main categories involves subcategories and finer distinctions;[47] and the thinking of individuals may well transcend 'ideal type' categories.[48]

Moreover, some of Wight's Revolutionists are comparable to Waltz's second-image theorists in that they champion ideological uniformity in the organization of states. Waltz's distinction between the 'optimistic noninterventionism' of figures such as Kant, Cobden and Bright, and the 'messianic interventionism' of Mazzini, Wilson and the communists might be compared to Wight's distinction between 'soft' and 'hard' Revolutionists, although Wight discriminated more explicitly between liberal democratic and dictatorial types of active interventionism.[49] Similarly, some of Wight's Realists appear in Waltz's analysis as first-image theorists, because of their emphasis on the imperfections of human nature (such as Spinoza),[50] or as third-image theorists, because of their preoccupation with international anarchy (such as Machiavelli and Hobbes).[51]

However, few of the philosophers and policy-makers whom Wight discussed at some length as examples of an essentially Rationalist outlook figure prominently in Waltz's analysis. The index to Waltz's book includes no references to Suarez, Grotius or Burke; and Locke and Gladstone are each mentioned only once.[52] The explanation may well reside in the fact that Waltz organized his analysis around the question, 'Where are the major causes of war to be found?'.[53] As Wight observed, 'It is not characteristic of the Rationalist tradition to speculate about the "causes of war"' (p. 207). The Rationalist tradition accepts war as a deplorable but ineradicable reality of international politics that must be contained, controlled and directed, in so far as this is possible, to morally and politically acceptable ends. Waltz described his conclusion as 'realistic,' in that he excluded the remedy of world government as 'unattainable in practice'; but it might also be considered Rationalist, in that he argued that even governments 'whose ends are worthy and whose means are fastidious' must reckon with the risk of war, given international anarchy.[54]

[45] Ibid., pp. 14, 238.
[46] Ibid., pp. 10, 160, 227.
[47] Ibid., pp. 13, 18–19, 83–4, 181–6, 219–23.
[48] See Waltz's discussion of Bismarck in ibid., pp. 3, 225–6; of Kant, pp. 161–5; and of Morgenthau and Niebuhr, pp. 33–41.
[49] Ibid., pp. 103–14.
[50] Ibid., pp. 21–4, 161.
[51] Ibid., p. 7. Waltz, it will be recalled, based much of his analysis of the third image (international anarchy) on Rousseau. Wight identified elements of all three traditions in Rousseau's thinking; but Wight emphasized Rousseau's inspiration to Revolutionists, recalling Kant's description of Rousseau as 'the Newton of the moral world' (p. 263).
[52] Ibid., pp. 105, 230.
[53] Ibid., p. 12.
[54] Ibid., p. 238.

Some scholars who have recently suggested other arrangements outlining patterns or traditions in the history of Western thinking about international politics have acknowledged the importance of Wight's work (basing their judgements mainly on the accounts of the lectures by Bull and Porter) and have felt obliged to justify rejecting Wight's approach. Michael Donelan, for example, has proposed arranging the historical material into five 'ways of thought'—natural law, realism, fideism, rationalism and historicism—on the grounds that 'further analysis' (not further described) suggested the advisability of 'inflation' beyond Wight's three traditions.[55] Martin Ceadel has offered five 'ideal types or paradigms', which he has labelled militarism, crusading, defencism, pacific-ism and pacifism, to describe the ends and means endorsed by various analysts and policy-makers. Even though all rubrics in any system of classification must be defined and Ceadel himself has invented new words as labels for two of his own categories ('defencism' and 'pacific-ism') that are not readily intelligible without some study, Ceadel has asserted that Wight's rubrics of Realism, Revolutionism and Rationalism 'were not well chosen'. Ceadel has also declared that 'Wight's typology is of little help without its subdivisions', that specific thinkers cannot and should not be confined to a single tradition and that the traditions 'can lead also to a running together of the views of similar but far from identical thinkers'.[56] Wight himself made all the latter points in the lectures, of course; and these objections apply with almost as much force to an arrangement with five main categories as to one with three.[57] Neither Donelan nor Ceadel identifies any significant shortcomings in the intellectual architecture proposed by Wight.

Theory might be defined as a quest for truth in the form of general principles that are consistent, to the maximum extent possible, with historical accuracy. Most generalizations, however, involve some simplification and hence some injustice to the complexity of a specific historical context and the richness of a specific thinker's ideas. The three traditions identified and analysed by Wight are no exception, as he pointed out. Wight's organization of the ideas is nonetheless more faithful to the intricate and elusive historical realities in question—and less unjust to specific thinkers and patterns of thought—than many other arrangements that have been proposed. The traditions outlined by Wight encompass all the major political philosophers of the Western states-system, with most of the distinctions well justified and the anomalies and shortcomings inherent in any system of classification fully acknowledged.

[55] Michael Donelan, *Elements of international political theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 1–2.

[56] Martin Ceadel, *Thinking about peace and war* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 19, 193–4.

[57] A fivefold approach may nonetheless offer advantages regarding some questions, as in the lucid analysis of differing views about the justice of war by Inis L. Claude, Jr, 'Just wars: doctrines and institutions', *Political Science Quarterly* 95, Spring 1980, pp. 83–96.

Eurocentrism and beyond

The charge by Bull and Porter (and others) that Wight's analysis is 'Eurocentric' can scarcely be disputed. Wight has only a few tentative observations to offer on traditions of thinking about international relations in India, China and the Islamic world, despite his having taken up Tocqueville's challenge 'to rediscover . . . the principal ideas in these fields . . . in circulation among the human race'. On the other hand, Wight's mastery of the Western traditions has rarely been equalled, and it is essential to understand these traditions because they have shaped international institutions and general attitudes and policies, even (to some extent) in non-Western societies, owing to Western dominance during the expansion of the Europe-centred states-system from the fifteenth century to the twentieth.

The legacy of Western dominance includes the main institutions of the states-system today, such as diplomatic practices and international law, the United Nations and other global organizations, and international commercial and financial procedures. Wight's analysis of the major Western traditions of thought could form an excellent basis for further scholarly enquiry into the question of the universality of patterns of thinking about these institutions. To what extent, for example, are values nominally endorsed by all members of the United Nations (in the UN Charter and in other basic documents, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, many composed mainly by Western officials during and after the Second World War) consistent with the predominant traditions of thinking about international relations in specific countries and culture-regions? What evidence might be found to support a hypothesis that many people in particular countries and/or culture-regions regard nominally universal institutions and values quite differently, owing in part to their distinct traditions? In what ways (and to what degree) might long-standing Western-derived international institutions and standards of behaviour be modified under the continuing impact of non-Western traditions?[58]

Wight's analysis of Western traditions could furnish a baseline for exploring traditions in non-European societies. To what extent may parallels to the main Western traditions be identified? In what ways do specific non-Western traditions differ? How might the differences be explained? Wight's assertion, supported solely by a reference to the Realism in Kautilya, that 'in Hindu political thinking there is no Rationalist tradition' (p. 110) might be critically examined through a historical survey of Indian theory and practice as acute and extensive as that which Wight prepared regarding the West. Wight's tentative sketch of possible parallels in Chinese philosophy to the three main traditions he discerned in the West (pp. 66–9) might form a point of departure for an in-depth analysis of the history of China's traditions regarding international

[58] For contrasting views on such questions, see Adda Bozeman, 'The international order in a multicultural world', in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds, *The expansion of international society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) and R. J. Vincent, *Human rights and international relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

politics. The framework provided by Wight's lectures could thus be used as a conceptual instrument for cross-cultural comparative studies regarding elites, nations, states-systems or culture-regions.

The charge of Eurocentrism should be placed in perspective by considering the amount of attention Wight devoted to European interactions with non-Western societies. The longest chapter in the book, entitled 'Theory of mankind: "barbarians"' draws on Wight's extensive work on the legal and administrative history of British colonialism, and on the history of the global extension of the Europe-centred Western states-system. Wight expressed great respect for non-European societies and implicit outrage regarding their exploitation and, in many cases, their 'extermination' by Western colonizers. In his account of the debates over the centuries in Western societies about how 'barbarians' should be treated, it is clear that Wight aligned himself with the Rationalist theorists—beginning with sixteenth-century Spanish theologians and jurists such as Suarez, Las Casas and Vitoria—who held that indigenous peoples had rights, including rights to property and freedom of conscience, that should be respected (pp. 22, 69–70).

Wight pointed out that these principles were often not observed, partly because of the prevalence of far older traditions of Realism that, beginning with the ancient Greeks, held that 'barbarians' have no rights. Wight gave examples such as the medieval German expansion against the Slavs and 'Cromwell's massacres' in Ireland (pp. 52–5) before turning to more recent events. As Wight observed,

> That *barbarians are not human* followed easily from the doctrine that they have no rights; indeed it was its premise . . . Three policies are likely to follow on from the idea that certain types are sub-human: if tractable and muscular, they will be enslaved; if intractable and useless, exterminated; and if there are too many to be exterminated and they are difficult to organize they will be segregated. The most obvious example of enslavement is of course the transatlantic slave trade, when ten million were uprooted. (p. 62, emphasis in original)

Even Rationalists, Wight noted, came to justify imperialism and the colonization of 'barbarian'—that is, non-European—regions of the world. The method was to assert that, while 'barbarians' had rights, these were 'not full rights, not equal rights, but appropriate rights' (p. 79). This approach transformed the concept of 'trusteeship' into a right to rule others.

> For Locke it is a doctrine justifying a community in getting rid of a ruler whom members of the community had contracted to set over their affairs; for Burke it is a doctrine justifying a community in thrusting its rule upon barbarians who had never asked for it. For Locke, it means the right of rebellion; for Burke, it means the right of empire. (p. 76)

Even though this right meant, for Burke and many other Rationalists, a duty to govern colonies honestly and responsibly, it is evident that Wight had no

sympathy for the 'paternalist' argument that would allow European colonial powers alone to determine when non-European peoples were fit for independence. Wight cited with approval Gladstone's principle that 'It is liberty alone that makes men fit for liberty' (p. 81).

It is surprising in this regard that Bull accused Wight of 'insensitivity about non-Western peoples and their aspirations'. Bull's charge was based in part on what Bull called Wight's 'comparison between the Afro-Asian powers and the revisionist powers of the 1930s'.[59] Now that Wight's lectures have at last been published, it is evident that this comparison formed part of a broader discussion of 'have-not' powers expressing resentment against the patronizing attitudes of superiority manifest in established Western powers (pp. 89–90). Indeed, rather than equating the aggrieved victims of colonization with fascists, Wight likened European colonialism to Hitler's conquests in Europe:

> The doctrine that barbarians have no rights was reimported by Hitler from the frontiers to the centre of international society, and vividly expressed when in March 1939 he erected Bohemia into a protectorate. Britain and other powers had invented these categories for handling barbarian nations; Hitler too would have his colonial empire in the very middle of Europe, reducing many 'famous and ancient states of Europe' [in Churchill's phrase] to rightlessness, since they were Slav barbarians [in Nazi doctrine]. The deepest reason why the West was shocked by Hitler was his introducing colonial methods of power politics, their own colonial methods, into [intra-European] international relations. Non-European nations could not share European horror at Hitler's methods, even his massacre of the Jews: the Second World War was for them a European civil war and its methods they had seen before. (p. 61)

The Revolutionist approach to 'barbarians' has largely triumphed since 1945. This is the doctrine that 'barbarians have equal rights' (p. 83). Anticolonialism has asserted the 'absolute right to freedom' (p. 86) of colonized peoples; but it has taken different forms, owing in part to the differences in the policies of the various colonial powers. The French pursued, Wight noted, the 'antithesis of British colonial policy', in that the French sought the assimilation of their colonial subjects and were 'sublimely incapable of distinguishing between the universal Rights of Man and French culture' (p. 91). In contrast, in the case of the USSR, 'in theory, there is no identification between Communist doctrine and Russian national culture', although 'perhaps in practice Soviet colonial policy is a policy of Russification, as was the Tsarist policy' (p. 95).

Now that the Soviet Union, in some respects the last major European colonial empire, has disintegrated, the questions raised by Wight's analysis are quite timely. In the early 1950s George F. Kennan outlined what Wight called a 'superbly Rationalist' agenda of preferred future Russian policies—an abandonment of subversive and revolutionary goals regarding foreign governments, an end to excessive internal authoritarianism, and a halt to the oppression of

[59] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', p. 115.

peoples capable of national independence. Wight dismissed this hopeful vision as 'completely unrealist . . . and . . . remote from attainability'. (pp. 132–3)

The central questions can still be usefully posed in Wightean terms. Assuming that the Russian federation can avoid fragmentation and civil war, what approach will Moscow adopt toward its former dominions? Will Russia's dealings with the other former Soviet republics be based on Rationalist (or Grotian) principles, implying democratization and the development of relations of mutual respect, regulated largely by international law? Or will the Russians pursue harsh Realist (or Machiavellian) policies, seeking to dominate several, if not all, of their weaker neighbours or even to incorporate them into a new empire or sphere of influence? Might the Russians even attempt to devise a new quasi-Revolutionist ideology to furnish a legitimacy principle for such an empire? In view of Russia's past and the discrediting of Marxism–Leninism, this might be an anti-Western messianic ideology, driven in part by a determination to maintain Russia's great power status, perhaps with strands of authoritarianism, Russian national chauvinism, Orthodoxy, and/or pan-Slavism.

The foreign policies of former colonies, including relations with the erstwhile *métropole*, also deserve more analysis in a comparative perspective. To what extent have differences in European colonial practices (British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, etc.) had distinct side-effects? If, for example, many of the African states that were formerly French colonies have retained unusually close political, economic and military ties to Paris, to what extent have their elites been acculturated into French traditions of statecraft? To what extent have fundamental concepts about international politics in formerly colonized states been influenced by a *métropole*'s traditions, as opposed to indigenous ones? If nations formerly dominated by Soviet Russia retain their independence, what will be the effects of the decades (or centuries) of Russian dominance on their political culture regarding international relations?

In short, Wight's 'Eurocentric' focus on Western traditions of dealing with 'barbarians' may paradoxically blaze the trail for valuable analyses combining historical and theoretical research about more general questions regarding colonialism and relations with vulnerable 'barbarians'. What theories have prevailed within non-Western colonial empires? What traditions have the Chinese, for example, had towards 'barbarians'? In what ways have they paralleled and differed from the main Western traditions, and how may they affect current and future decisions about the non-Chinese peoples subject to Beijing? When in a position of strength and effective authority over non-Islamic peoples, have Islamic elites tended to enforce assimilation through mandatory conversion? When a policy of relative tolerance has prevailed (during certain periods, for instance, in parts of the Ottoman empire), on what theory of relations with 'barbarians' has this been based?[60]

[60] Partial answers to these questions may be found in Adam Watson's *The evolution of international society: a comparative historical analysis* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), a remarkable and trail-blazing study, based in part on the work of Martin Wight, regarding ancient states-systems and the origins and history of the modern, originally Europe-centred, states-system.

Wight's analysis of Western traditions also offers a firm basis for building on his work and that of others about the dynamics of change within states-systems. David Armstrong's valuable new study, for example, examines the interactions between revolutionary states—e.g., Revolutionary France, Bolshevik Russia, Sukarno's Indonesia, Castro's Cuba and communist China—and what he calls 'the Westphalian conception of international society'. Armstrong suggests that such states usually set out with 'a teleological view of world politics . . . some iron law of history which they are uniquely privileged to perceive'. At length, however, a 'socialization' process takes place: 'an initial hostility towards these institutions of international society' yields 'to a grudging acceptance of their value' in ensuring access to the prerogatives associated with statehood and sovereignty.[61]

In Wightean terms, Revolutionist ardour is qualified as such governments recognize the advantages of the Grotian framework of international intercourse. Armstrong also finds that Revolutionary states nonetheless have leavened 'the Westphalian conception' by introducing new standards of international legitimacy such as national self-determination, constitutional government and a legal order protecting basic human rights.[62] Wight sketched such interactions between the states-system and revolutionary regimes in his chapter on international legitimacy in *Systems of states*.[63] Wight's lectures, however, complement this work and important new studies such as Armstrong's by providing a lucid framework for understanding the arguments articulated by revolutionary states and by the defenders of the 'Westphalian conception', both Realists and Rationalists.[64]

The merits of Wight's analysis

In 1977, Stanley Hoffmann suggested that studies of international relations in the United States could benefit from 'triple distance . . . away from the contemporary, toward the past; [away] from the perspective of a superpower (and a highly conservative one), toward that of the weak and the revolutionary . . . ; [and away] from the glide into policy science, back to the steep ascent toward the peaks which the questions raised by traditional political philosophy represent'.[65] These suggestions have been followed to some extent, with works

[61] David Armstrong, *Revolution and world order: the revolutionary state in international society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 301–2.

[62] Ibid., pp. 304–8.

[63] Wight, *Systems of states*, pp. 153-73.

[64] Incidentally, one of the several merits of Armstrong's study is his perceptive discussion of the differences between 'regime theories' and the 'international society' approach associated with authorities such as Wight and Bull. Armstrong, *Revolution and world order*, pp. 308–9. See also Barry Buzan, 'From international system to international society: structural realism and regime theory meet the English school', *International Organization* 47, Summer 1993, pp. 327-52, and the recent analysis of Bull's work in this regard by Ian Harris, 'Order and Justice in *The anarchical society*', *International Affairs* 69:4, Oct. 1993, pp. 725–41.

[65] Stanley Hoffmann, 'An American social science: international relations', in *Janus and Minerva: essays in the theory and practice of international politics* (Boulder, CO, and London: Westview, 1987), p. 23. (This essay was originally published in *Daedalus*, Summer 1977.)

bridging the gap between history and theory,[66] area studies striving to overcome US ethnocentrism,[67] and analyses examining the cogency and continuing relevance of the theories about international politics advanced by great political philosophers.[68]

Martin Wight's analysis of the main Western traditions of thinking about international relations could, however, offer a solid touchstone for further enquiries. As suggested above with regard to Wight's 'Eurocentrism', for example, his approach offers a general framework to help in the analysis of what has been called the 'strategic culture' of specific culture-regions, nations or elites.[69] Indeed, examining views about certain key ideas involved in these traditions could form part of analyses of the thinking and attitudes—the 'operational code' or 'strategic personality'—of specific decision-makers or groups of policy-makers, and could furnish insights about probable decisions regarding strategy, arms control and other matters.[70] The traditions also offer a matrix of great analytical and pedagogical value to place current debates about foreign and security policy and international order into historical and philosophical perspective. Wight's analysis, moreover, obviously constitutes a framework for studies of specific philosophers who made substantial contributions to the corpus of theory about international politics.[71]

Broader questions also deserve attention. For instance, was Wight's threefold analysis of the Western traditions original? Bull wrote that it was 'profoundly original. There is one passage in Gierke's account of the natural law tradition in which the germ of the idea is stated, but I have seen no evidence that Wight was aware of this passage and in any case it does not entail the great structure of

[66] Notable examples may be found in the series of Princeton Studies in International History and Politics—for instance, Philip H. Gordon's fine study, *A certain idea of France: French security policy and the Gaullist legacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[67] For useful discussions, see Richard J. Samuels and Myron Weiner, eds, *The political culture of foreign area and international studies: essays in honor of Lucian W. Pye* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1992).

[68] For perceptive analyses examining Kantian theories in the light of historical experience, see Michael W. Doyle, 'Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, Summer 1983, pp. 205–35, and Fall 1983, pp. 323–53; and his 'Liberalism and world politics', *American Political Science Review* 80, Dec. 1986, pp. 1151-69.

[69] On 'strategic culture', see among other sources Jack L. Snyder, 'The concept of strategic culture: caveat emptor', and Ken Booth, 'The concept of strategic culture affirmed', both in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., *Strategic power: USA/USSR* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990); Yitzhak Klein, 'A theory of strategic culture', *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 10, no. 1, 1991, pp. 3–23; and Stephen Peter Rosen, 'The problem of strategy and culture', forthcoming. See also Samuel P. Huntington, 'The clash of civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs* 72, Summer 1993, pp. 22–49, and the articles commenting on this essay in subsequent issues.

[70] Alexander L. George, *The 'operational code': a neglected approach to the study of political leaders and decision-making*, RM-5427-PR (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, Sept. 1967). On the concept of 'strategic personality', see Robert D. Blackwill and Ashton B. Carter, 'The role of intelligence', in Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, eds, *New nuclear nations: consequences for US policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), pp. 216–50.

[71] For a discussion of Wight's framework with reference to Grotius, see Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, 'Introduction: Grotian thought in international relations', in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, eds, *Hugo Grotius and international relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 6–10, 14, 54–60. R. J. Vincent also found Wight's architecture useful in his studies of specific thinkers and their significance, notably 'The Hobbesian tradition in twentieth century international thought', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, Summer 1981, pp. 91–101 and 'Edmund Burke and the theory of international relations', *Review of International Studies* 10, July 1984, pp. 205–218.

ideas which, when fully grown in his mind, it became.'[72] Wight did, however, cite Gierke's famous work repeatedly in these lectures (pp. 72, 100) and in other works; and he recommended it to students in a reading list (p. 271).[73] K. J. Holsti has written that, although they used 'somewhat different labels', Gierke, Wight and Bull 'have all summarized the main world images under the rubrics of the Hobbesian, Grotian, and Kantian traditions'.[74]

The origins of the conception are, of course, less important than the origins of the traditions themselves. Gierke, Wight and Bull agreed that the genesis was during the period from the fourteenth to the mid-seventeenth century, when the universal institutions of Western Christendom, the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire, were losing authority to the nascent modern states. Some thinkers (Realists, in Wight's terminology) emphasized the competition between autonomous states, while others (Revolutionists) sought to restore papal and imperial authority, what Gierke called 'the unsubstantial ghost of the old *imperium mundi*'. But a third group (Rationalists) held, in Gierke's words, that 'there was a natural-law connection between all nations, and that this connection, while it did not issue in any authority exercised by the Whole over its parts, at any rate involved a system of mutual social rights and duties'.[75]

If the three traditions emerged in conjunction with the modern states-system over four hundred years ago, is it possible that other patterns of thinking might be more influential in other types of states-systems? Wight offered no conclusive answers to this question, but repeatedly pointed out that other types of universal political organization have at times been dominant in the history of Western civilization. 'The political kaleidoscope of the Greek and Hellenistic ages looks modern to our eyes, while the immense majesty of the Roman peace, and the Christian unity of the medieval world, seem remote and alien.'[76] He occasionally referred to 'the perhaps transient, perhaps expiring, period since the sixteenth century in which there has existed this peculiar society composed of sovereign states'.[77] In the lectures, Wight declared that 'the states-system is now manifestly in the same sort of anarchical obsolescence as the feudal kingdoms were when Machiavelli was born' (pp. 4–5). Although other theorists have raised the

[72] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', p. 111. Bull referred to Otto von Gierke, *Natural law and the theory of society 1500 to 1800*, trans. Ernest Barker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950, first publ. 1934), p. 85. This work was first published in German in 1913, the year of Wight's birth, and 'had been written some twenty years before', according to Ernest Barker's 'Introduction', pp. ix–x. Bull reproduced what he deemed the key passage from Gierke in his book, *The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 28.

[73] Wight especially recommended the essay by Ernst Troeltsch, which was published as an appendix to Gierke's book. For other references to Gierke's book by Wight, see 'An anatomy of international thought', p. 227 and *Systems of states*, p. 21.

[74] K. J. Holsti, *The dividing discipline: hegemony and diversity in international theory* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1985), pp. 26–7. Holsti, however, cites a different work by Gierke: *Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien* (Aslen: Scientia, 1955, first publ. 1880).

[75] Gierke, *Natural law and the theory of society*, p. 85.

[76] Wight, *Power politics*, 1978 edn, p. 24.

[77] Ibid., p. 137.

possibility of a 'new medievalism' requiring different principles for action,[78] Wight offered no specific forecast.

Perhaps the most fundamental question raised by Wight's work concerns the kinds of knowledge that can be achieved in theoretical enquiry in international relations. Kenneth Waltz has complained that 'Among the depressing features of international-political studies is the small gain in explanatory power that has come from the large amount of work done in recent decades. Nothing seems to accumulate, not even criticism.'[79] In response to a similar lament, Hoffmann wrote that 'Waltz seems to blame the theorists, rather than asking whether the fiasco does not result from the very nature of the field. Can there *be* a theory of undetermined behavior, which is what "diplomatic-strategic action", to use [Raymond] Aron's terms, amounts to?'[80] The free wills, differing priorities and ultimately contingent choices of the many decision-makers in international politics place severe limits on the aspirations towards 'prediction' and 'explanation' held by some scholars. As Hoffmann noted, Aron has 'demonstrated why a theory of undetermined behavior cannot consist of a set of propositions explaining general laws that make prediction possible, and can do little more than define basic concepts, analyze basic configurations, sketch out the permanent features of a constant logic of behavior, in other words make the field intelligible'.[81]

From this perspective, as Bull observed, theoretical work in international relations is 'philosophical in character. It does not lead to cumulative knowledge after the manner of natural science . . . All of this must follow once we grant Wight's initial assumption that theoretical inquiry into International Relations is necessarily about moral or prescriptive questions.'[82] Indeed, Wight argued that 'historical interpretation' is the counterpart of political theory for international politics, and wrote that he was tempted to say that 'there is no international theory except the kind of rumination about human destiny to which we give the unsatisfactory name of philosophy of history'.[83] In the lectures, Wight added that 'judging the validity of . . . [the] ethical principles [followed by statesmen] . . . is not a process of scientific analysis; it is more akin to literary criticism. It involves developing a sensitive awareness of the intractability of all political situations, and the moral quandary in which all statecraft operates' (p. 258). To

[78] Wolfers, 'Political theory and international relations', p. 242; Bull, *The anarchical society*, pp. 254–5, 264–76, 285–6. In an important recent interview (*Le Monde*, 27 Oct. 1992), Pierre Hassner discussed the possibility that the world is entering 'a new middle ages' [*un nouveau Moyen Age*], with 'anarchy and permanent conflicts', among other factors, placing into question the principles of international order dating from the treaty of Westphalia.

[79] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of international politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 18.

[80] Hoffmann, 'An American social science', p. 15; emphasis in original.

[81] Ibid. See also Hoffmann's essay, 'Raymond Aron and the theory of international relations', in *Janus and Minerva*, pp. 52–69. Wight expressed unqualified admiration for Aron's masterwork *Peace and war* in his review, 'Tract for the nuclear age', *The Observer*, 23 April 1967.

[82] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', p. 114. For a similar view, see Wolfers, 'Political theory and international relations', p. 249.

[83] Wight, 'Why is there no international theory?', p. 33.

develop such an awareness, Wight recommended the study of history, starting with Thucydides, and of works of literature by authors such as Conrad, Hardy, Koestler, Orwell, Swift and Tolstoy.[84]

In short, Wight's lectures encouraged his students to seek greater historical and philosophical knowledge. He identified an order in interrelated ideas that helped them, and that can help us, to understand better the assumptions, arguments and dilemmas associated with each of the main traditions of thinking about international politics in the West since Machiavelli. As Wight pointed out, such knowledge of the past provides an

escape from the *Zeitgeist*, from the mean, narrow, provincial spirit which is constantly assuring us that we are at the peak of human achievement, that we stand on the edge of unprecedented prosperity or an unparalleled catastrophe . . . It is a liberation of the spirit to acquire perspective, to recognize that every generation is confronted by problems of the utmost subjective urgency, but that an objective grading is probably impossible; to learn that the same moral predicaments and the same ideas have been explored before. (p. 6)

[84] Wight's reading suggestions regarding history may be found in 'Why is there no international theory?', p. 32. His literature suggestions may be found in *International theory: the three traditions* (p. 258), which also contains a reading list on the three traditions of political philosophy regarding international relations (pp. 269–72).

An edited text of the 1994 Martin Wight Memorial Lecture entitled 'Beyond The Three Traditions: the philosophy of war and peace in historical perspective', given by Professor Pierre Hassner on 17 March 1994 at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, will be published in the October 1994 issue of International Affairs.